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Admiralty - Wrongful Death - The Harrisburg Overruled
The petitioner's decedent, a longshoreman, was killed by a falling hatch
team while working on board a vessel anchored in the territorial waters
of Florida. The petitioner, as the decedent's widow and representative of
his personal estate, filed a complaint in state court against the owner of the
vessel, alleging that a defective locking arrangement caused the hatch
beam to become disengaged from its position, thus striking and instantly
killing the decedent. The claim was brought under the Florida Wrongful
death Act 1 and was predicated on two theories: (1) the alleged negligence
of the shipowner in failing to keep the vessel's equipment in a reasonably
safe condition; and (2) the maritime concept of unseaworthiness, which
imposes upon a shipowner the absolute, continuing and nondelegable duty'
to provide employed seamen, including longshoremen,' with a ship, equip-
ment and crew which are reasonably fit for their intended use.' On removal
to the United States district court the allegations relating to unseaworthi-
ness were dismissed on the ground that the Florida wrongful death statute
did not encompass that concept as a basis of liability. The court of appeals
affirmed an interlocutory appeal after receiving a negative answer from
the Florida Supreme Court concerning the issue of unseaworthiness.' The
United States Supreme Court granted the petitioner's writ of certiorari.'
'The claim was filed individually under the Florida Wrongful Death Act, FLA. STAT. ANN. §
768.01 (1965), and as personal representative of her deceased husband's estate for the recovery of
damages for his pain and suffering prior to death under the Florida Survival Act, FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 45.11 (1965). For cases distinguishing survival statutes from wrongful death statutes, see Curtis
v. A. Garcia y Cia., 241 F.2d 30 (3d Cir. 1957); The Kaian Maru, 2 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1924),
discussed in Vancouver S.S. Co. v. Rice, 288 U.S. 445 (1938); see Just v. Chambers, 213 U.S.
383 (1941) (state law providing for survival of action for personal injuries is applicable in a pro-
ceeding in admiralty involving claims against the shipowner for personal injuries received on a ship
cruising within the territorial limits of the state). See generally Comment, The Application of
State Survival Statutes in Maritime Causes, 60 COL. L. REV. 534 (1950).
2 Lowe v. Vessel Madrid, 210 F. Supp. 826 (D.C. Fla. 1962).
aId. See also Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946); and see Alaska S.S. Co. v.
Petterson, 347 U.S. 396 (1954); Rogers v. United States Lines, 347 U.S. 984 (1954) (per curiam).
' The shipowner's duty does not require him to provide an "accident free" ship; he is under
a duty "only to furnish a vessel and appurtenances reasonably fit for their intended use. The
standard is not perfection, but reasonable fitness, not a ship that will weather every conceivable
storm or withstand every imaginable peril of the sea, but a vessel reasonably suitable for her in-
tended service." Mitchell v. Travel Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 549-50 (1960); accord Mills v.
Mitsubishi Shipping Co., 358 F.2d 609 (5th Cir. 1966).5 Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 211 So. 2d 161 (Fla. Sup. Ct. 1968). The district court
was affirmed in 409 F.2d 32 (5th Cir. 1969).
6396 U.S. 900 (1969).
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Held, reversed and remanded: the general maritime law provides a right
to recover for death caused by violation of maritime duties, notwithstand-
ing whether the action accords with the terms of the local wrongful death
statute as interpreted by the courts of the state. The rule established by
The Harrisburg' that there is no such action in maritime cases apart from
statute, "dubious even when rendered," is now an "unjustifiable anomaly"
that should no longer be regarded as acceptable law.' Moragne v. States
Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
I. THE SPECIAL PROBLEM OF MARITIME WRONGFUL DEATH
A. The Problem
One of the difficult questions concerning the interrelationship of federal
and state law has been the application of substantive law to provide a
remedy for a maritime tort resulting in death.' Historically, courts have
held that the constraints of the federal system require that if a state pro-
vides a remedy for tortious death which is not in conflict with the mari-
time law, the appropriate court should enforce that right as it is defined
and limited by the state."0 Directly opposing this state-nation relationship,
on the other hand, is the frequently asserted proposition that the constitu-
tional grant to the federal courts of the judicial power in admiralty1' in-
cludes the idea that not only is the federal law supreme over any applica-
tion of state law in cases where the general maritime law applies,"2 but
also that the maritime law should uniformily be applied."3 The leading
cases on the subject is Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen,4 where the United
States Supreme Court held that the Constitution precluded the application
of a state workmen's compensation statute to an action arising out of the
death of a stevedore killed while working on a vessel within a state's
territorial waters. The test used by the Court was that such a statute can-
not be applied if it "works material prejudice to the characteristic features
of the general maritime law or interferes with the proper harmony and
uniformity of that law in its international and interstate relations."' 5 The
problem, of course, has been that heretofore when death resulted from a
wrongful act committed within state territorial water's the maritime law
has been held not to be applicable. This is so even though maritime law
is applicable and provides a remedy in situations where for example the
tort occurs on the high seas 7 or involves a seaman where death results
7119 U.S. 199 (1886).
8 398 U.S. at 378.
'See generally Day, Maritime Wrongful Death and Survival Recovery: The need for Legis-
lative Reform, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 648 (1964). For a critical discussion, see Black, Admiralty
Jurisdiction: Critique and Suggestions, 50 COLuM. L. REV. 259 (1950).
"°Levinson v. Deupree, 345 U.S. 648 (1953).
"U.S. CoNSr. art. III, § 2.
"The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 558 (1874).
'- See, e.g., Day, supra note 9; Stevens, Erie R.R. v. Tompkins and the Uniform General Mari-
time Law, 64 HARV. L. REV. 246 (1950).
'4244 U.S. 205 (1917).
'
5id. at 216.
'"The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588 (1959); The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199 (1886).
"'46 U.S.C. S 761 (1920).
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from negligence."' These remedies are legislative, however, and Congress
has chosen not to legislate within the state's three-mile limit. As a result,
the courts have looked to the state-created right, i.e., its wrongful death
statute, in deference to the doctrine that since such stautes are remedial,
judicial legislaion should be left to the state." Furthermore, unlike the
supremacy doctrine, maritime uniformity is not an end to itself, the ra-
tionale being that judicial creation of federal law merely for the sake of
uniformity might undercut such constraints of federalism as providing
local solutions to peculiarly local problems or where state law affords mari-
time reform, and judicial legislation is held to be proper."' Thus, in cases
where there is conflict between state law and federal interests of uniformity
the Supreme Court has balanced these interests in maritime wrongful
death situations and held that the benefits provided by local solution have
outweighed the need for a federal rule." Nevertheless, the use of state
wrongful death legislation in maritime cases has been subject to increasing
attack as producing anomolous situations which are justified neither by
constitutional dangers inherent in federal interference with state policy
nor by state equitable considerations of sacrificing federal law in favor of
state-by-state solutions. More specifically, situations involving those per-
sons for whom the maritime laws was designed to protect are illustrative
of an uncertainty inherent in applying state remedial law which can be
criticized as undermining all considerations of equity.
Nonseamen. In cases involving nonseamen who were merely injured with-
in the territorial waters of a state, both state and federal courts have applied
the maritime law, since the scope and limitations of recovery for tortious
injury is defined by the maritime law and therefore excludes any definition
by state law." If the injured victim later died, however, courts applied
state law, because the maritime law did not define recovery for wrongful
death.' The criticism directed to this type of situation is that identical con-
duct violating federal law produced liability if the victim was only injured,
but frequently not if he was killed. The result is said to be hardly con-
sistant with equitable principles which demand that conduct be adjudged
the same in similar situations.' Moreover, the common law rule of con-
tributory negligence is a complete bar to recovery and is thus applied in
18 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1915). For a discussion of the application of this Act, see Stumberg, The
Jones Act: Remedies of Seamen, 17 OHIo ST. L.J. 484 (1956).
"See The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588, 597 (1959) (concurring opinion).
"Note, The Federal Common Law, 82 HARv. L. REV. 1512, 1517 (1969); see also Wechsler,
The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection
of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954).
" Hess v. United States, 361 U.S. 314 (1960).
"Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953).
'See, e.g., The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588 (1959); Hess v. United States, 361 U.S.
314 (1960); Goett v. Union Carbide, 361 U.S. 340 (1960).
24 The strongest criticism in this area has come for the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit. For example, in Kenny v. Trinidad Corp., 349 F.2d 832 (5th Cir. 1965), the court
affirmed the "strange principle that the substantive rules of law governing human conduct in regard
to maritime torts vary in their origin depending on whether the conduct gives rise to fatal or
non-fatal injury." Id. at 834 n.3 quoting Mr. Justice Brennan in The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358
U.S. 588, 611 (1959) (dissenting opinion) [Emphasis added.]. In an addedum opinion the court
pled for the overruling either by legislative act or by decision of "[t]his vagary in the law ....
Id. at 840.
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local maritime wrongful death actions." In cases where no death resulted,
however contributory negligence has had no application, the maritime rule
of comparative damages controlling the question of the amount of re-
covery.' Thus, identical torts measured against even the "slightest" negli-
gence of the deceased have frequently allowed or disallowed recovery,
dependent not upon principles of uniformity and maritime supremacy,
but rather upon the forum state in which the suit was brought and local
statute construction."
Seamen. A converse situation, but identical in result, has arisen in those
cases where state legislation has allowed recovery for death of a seaman
caused by unseaworthiness of the vessel. Identical breaches of the duty
to provide a seaworthy ship have produced liability for the death of a
crew member when he was protected by the Death on the High Seas
Act' or the death of a longshoreman when protected by state statute,29
but barred recovery if the crew member was killed on state territorial
waters, since by the operation of the Jones Act,"M the concept of unsea-
worthiness is not available as a remedy for wrongful death and as such
supersedes state legislation to the contrary." Therefore, by holding that
the maritime law has no application to such an action, the courts have
refused to grant a remedy to those persons for whom the doctrine of un-
seaworthiness was intended' and, at the same time, have granted recovery
for death caused by unseaworthiness to those persons for whom the doc-
trine was extended only because they perform work traditionally done
by seamen."
B. The Source of the Problem
The maritime rule denying the existence of wrongful death recovery
arose out of the common law rule that a civil action does not lie for
damages suffered due to the wrongful death of another. In the absence of
a specific statute the right of action for the injury dies with the deceased.'
"For a listing of the cases, see 25 C.J.S. DEATH § 46b at 1141; 16 AM. JUR. DEATH §§
130-31 at 88-9.
"
5 The Max Morris, 137 U.S. 1 (1890); accord Ahlgren v. Red Star Towing Co., 214 F.2d
618 (2d Cir. 1954).
" See generally Kolius & Cecil, Maritime Torts Resulting in Death in State Territorial Waters,
26 INs. COUNSEL J. 567 (1959).
28See, e.g., Vessel Judith Lee Rose, Inc. v. Chermesino, 211 F. Supp. 36 (D. Mass. 1962), aff'd
317 F.2d 927 (1st Cir. 1963); Maryland v. Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co., 176 F. Supp. 664, 667 (D.
Md. 1959) (dictum).
"
9 The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 357 U.S. 588 (1959).
3046 U.S.C. S 688 (1958).
"l Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148 (1964); Lindgren v. United States, 281
U.S. 38 (1930).
aa Id.
'The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588 (1959).
"4 The rule at common law that no recovery was available for wrongful death emerged in Hig-
gins v. Butcher, 89 Yelv., 18 Noy (1607). In that case the plaintiff's decedent was denied recovery
in trespass for the assault of his decedent for two reasons. First, it was held that the maxim actio
personalsi moritor cuem persona prevented recovery to the plaintiff as representative of the deceased.
Second, if the plaintiff had brought an action for an injury to himself, the concept that the assault
was a felony which could only be punished by the king through a criminal process barred re-
covery because the civil trespass was thus merged with the felony. In the case of Baker v. Bolton,
1 Camp. 493, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (K.B. 1803), Lord Ellenborough, sitting at Nisi Prius, declared
that "[I]n a civil Court, the death of a human being could not be complained of as an injury;
[Vol. 3 6
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With the passenge of Lord Campbell's Act' in 1846, however, a sub-
stantive common law right to sue was given to designated survivors, and
became an exception to the common law wrongful death rule which was
immediately adopted by legislation in American states." Furthermore,
even though Lord Campbell's Act did not of itself apply to admiralty,"7
early cases included the exception within the maritime jurisdiction, reason-
ing that once the right was given, it should be recognized and compen-
sated by the maritime law as well as by statute.' The Supreme Court,
however, overruled this proposition in The Harrisburg,' a case in which
the state law barred prosecution of a wrongful death action because of the
limitation period expressed in the local wrongful death statute. In dis-
missing the action on the ground that maritime law was not applicable
the Court purportedly overruled cases to the contrary by stating:
The argument everywhere in support of such suits in admiralty has been,
not that the maritime law, as actually administered in common law countries,
is different from the common law in this particular, but that the common
law is not founded on good reason, and is contrary to natural equity and
the general principles of law.'
The Court concluded that, while some countries gave a right of recovery
for wrongful death, "the maritime law . . . leaves the matter untouched
.... " and it was the "duty of the courts to declare the law, not to make
it."'" This language implied that the maritime law could not grant greater
rights for tortious death than were available at common law, a proposi-
tion that the lower courts were quick to adopt in permitting the states
to grant recovery.' With regard to seamen, however, the adoption of
state remedies presented difficult problems in attempts to determine the
and in this case the damages, as to the plaintiff's wife, must stop with the period of her existence."
An analysis of the facts in that case shows, however, that no possible felony could have been in-
volved, as the plaintiff and his wife were negligently thrown from a carriage in which they were
riding. Furthermore, strictly speaking, the maxim actio personalis moritor cum persona would not
have applied as Lord Ellenborough himself discusses the question of damages for loss of services.
It has been suggested, therefore, that the confuion which surrounded Bolton resulted in the appli-
cation of the maxim to all subsequent actions for wrongful death rather than those brought soley
for injuries which were personal to the decedent (to which the maxim properly applies). Holds-
worth, The Origin of the Rule in Baker v. Bolton, 32 L.Q. REV. 431 (1916); Comment, Judicial
Expansion of Remedies for Wrongful Death in Admiralty: a Proposal, 49 BOSTON L. REV. 114
(1969).
'The Fatal Accidents Act, 9 & 10 Vict., c. 93 § 1-6 (1846):
Whensoever the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful act, neglect, or default
is such as would (if death had not ensued) have entitled the party to maintain an
action and recovery damages in respect thereof, then and in every such case the per-
son who would have been liable if death had not ensued shall be liable to an action
for damages, notwithstanding the death of the person injured, and although the death
shall have been caused under such circumstances as amounts in law to a felony.
"See PROSSER, TORTS § 105 (2d ed. 195S5).
"
7 See DeLovio v. Boit, 7 Fed. Cas. 418 (No. 37716) (C.C.D. Mass. 1815); GILMORE & BLACK,
THE LAW oF ADMIRALTY §§ 1-1 to 1-19 (1957). See also Loing, Historic Origins of Admiralty
Jurisdiction in England, 45 MICH. L. REV. 163 (1946).
"
5 The Garland, 5 F. 924 (E.D. Mich. 1881); cf. The E.B. Ward, Jr., 17 F. 456 (C.C.E.D.
La. 1883).
39119 U.S. 199 (1886).401d. at 213; compare The Highland Light, 12 Fed. Cas. 138 (No. 6,477) (C.C.D. Md.
1867) (right to compensation for wrongful death is a natural right).
41 119 U.S. at 213.
'See, e.g., Warren v. Morse Dry Dock & Repair Co., 235 N.Y. 445, 139 N.E. 569 (1928),
cert. denied, 262 U.S. 756 (1929).
1970]
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applicable substantive law in cases involving death on the high seas or
in a state other than the one in which the vessel was registered.' Addi-
tional problems were created by the Supreme Court case of The Osceola"
which held that the general maritime law did not recognize the existence
of a right to recover against an employer under the doctrine of respondeat
superior, thus limiting any recovery to the maritime concept of unsea-
worthiness.'
C. Attempted Solutions
To meet the above problems and to mitigate the effect of both The
Harrisburg and The Osceola, Congress enacted three statutes which are
controlling in their areas." By providing a negligence action for both
fatal and nonfatal injuries of a seaman, the Jones Act4 ' obviated the in-
consistency of prohibiting compensatory damages for negligent injury
under The Osceola and allowing damages for negligent death by using
state-created rights of recovery under the rationale of The Harrisburg.
Congress provided in the Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA)' that
certain classes of dependent survivors would have a remedy for a maritime
tort resulting in death when caused by the "wrongful act, neglect or
default" or another, and where death occurred more than one marine
league from shore. Initially, this language was construed as encompassing
only a negligence standard for recovery,"' but the Supreme Court has
since held that death due to unseaworthiness is permitted under that Act."
By express terms of the statute, however, the DOHSA has no application
" For a detailed analysis of the historical development, see Winfield, Death as Affecting Liability
in Tort, 29 COLUM. L. REV. 239 (1929).
44189 U.S. 158 (1903).
'The four propositions of the case are stated as follows:
(1) that the vessel and her owners are liable, in case a seaman falls sick, or is wound-
ed in the service of the ship, to the extent of his maintenance and cure, and to his
wages, at least so far as the voyage is continued;
(2) that the vessel and her owner are, both by English and American law, liable to
an indemnity for injuries received by seamen in consequence of the unseaworthiness
of the ship, or a failure to supply and keep in order the proper appliances appurtenant
to the ship;
(3) that all the members of the crew, except perhaps the master, are, as between
themselves, fellow servants, and hence seamen cannot recover for injuries sustained
through the negligence of another member of the crew beyond the expense of their
maintenance and cure;
(4) that the seaman is not allowed to recover an indemnity for the negligence of the
master, or any member of the crew, but is entitled to maintenance and cure, whether
the injuries were received by negligence or by accident.
Id. at 175. See generally Cunningham, Respondeat Superior in Admiralty, 19 HARv. L.
REV. 445 (1906).
4s Day, supra note 9, at 665-74.
4741 Stat. 1007, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1915):
Any seamen who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his employment may,
at his election, maintain an action for damages at law . . . and in such action all
statutes of the United States modifying or extending the common law right or remedy
in cases of personal injury to railway employees shall apply; and in case of death
of any seamen as a result of any such personal injury the personal representative
of such seamen may maintain an action for damages at law . . . and in such actions
all statutes of the United States conferring or regulating the right of action for death
in the case of railway employees shall be applicable.
4846 U.S.C. §§ 761-67 (1964).
"'Bugden v. Trawler Cambridge, 319 Mass. 315, 65 N.E.2d 533 (1946).
asThe Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588 (1959).
[Vol. 3 6
CURRENT LEGISLATION AND DECISIONS
for injuries resulting in death occurring within the state's territorial
waters.
The Longshoremen's and Harborworker's Compensation Act5 gave death
benefits with attendant limited liability to survivors of those workers
covered by the terms of the Act. It has further been held that harbor
workers can recover from the ship's owner as a third-party defendant-
tortfeasor and ,since that party is not the harbor worker's employer, the
action is not barred by the terms of the Act." Seamen, however, are not
provided for in the Act, and thus have no third-party claim against the
owner of the vessel since they are employed by that owner. Moreover,
the Jones Act negligence standard for death recovery is the exclusive
remedy against the seaman's employer, while those persons covered by the
Longshoremen's and Harborworker's Compensation Act may recover for
wrongful death caused by unseaworthiness when allowed by state statute."
Congress, however, has not promulgated wrongful death legislation that
answers the questions which arise concerning the availability of maritime
doctrines when injuries result in death within the state's navigable waters.'
Judicially, the Supreme Court has repeatedly insisted that the ability of
the states to incorporate the maritime principles is a matter subject to
state rather than federal control.' Insofar as state interest is concerned,
the cases generally have suggested two reasons why both Congress and the
Court have been hesitant to act. First, at least in regard to nonseamen,
states have a stronger interest in providing remedies and duties which
would apply to deaths occurring within their territorial waters, where
most claimants would be citizens of the state applying the remedy.' More
specifically, Mr. Justice Harlan has maintained that ". . . providing for
the victim's family, and preventing pauperism by shifting what would
otherwise be a public responsibility to those who committed the wrong
... are matters intimately concerned with the state's interest in regulating
familial relationships." 7 Second, application of state law fulfills a federal
interest in giving damages for wrongful death without arbitrary formula-
tions of beneficiary lists or damage limitations, the analogy being the appli-
cation of state limitations to atcions in federal statutory cases."
These considerations were examined by the Supreme Court in The Tun-
gus v. Skovgaard," a case involving the death of a maintenance foreman
while on board a vessel within New Jersey territorial waters. The Jones
Act was not available as a theory of recovery because the deceased was
5' 44 Stat. 1424, 33 U.S.C. § 901 (1927); see generally Stumberg, Harbor Workers and Work-
men's Compensation, 7 TEX. L. REV. 197 (1929).
5Lindgren v. United States, 281 U.S. 38 (1930); but see Holland v. Steag, Inc., 143 F. Supp.
203 (D. Mass. 1956); Kernan v. American Dredging Co., 355 U.S. 426, 430 n.4 (1958) (dictum).
53 d.
"4See S. REP. No. 3143, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); to date, no hearings have been scheduled
on the bill.
"' The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588 (1959); Hess v. United States, 361 U.S. 314 (1960).
a'See, e.g., The City of Norwalk, 55 F. 98 (S.D.N.Y. 1893).
"rHess v. United States, 361 U.S. 314, 332 (1960).
5SMoviecolor Ltd. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 288 F.2d 80, 83 (2d Cir. 1961); see also Currie,
Federalism and Admiralty: "The Devil's Own Mess," I SUp. CT. REv. 158 (1960).
s9358 U.S. 588 (1959).
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an employee of an independent contractor hired by the owner of the vessel
to unload cargo. The DOHSA inapplicable because of the three-mile limi-
tation. Further, the Longshoremen's and Harbor-worker's Act was utilized,
but gave only limited recovery." Thus, the clai mwas brought under the
New Jersey Wrongful Death Act"' on a theory of unseaworthiness. Al-
though the majority upheld the appellate court's decision to allow recovery,
relief was permitted only because it was decided that the state statute in
question would have been construed to encompass such a remedy."5 The
dissenting Justices, on the other hand, argued that the state statute merely
provided a remedy for enforcing a maritime duty, it therefore being im-
material whether the state courts would have granted relief."3 The premise
for the dissent's conclusion was that state wrongful death legislation should
be enforced to further federal rather than state policy. 4 Nevertheless, this
premise was rejected by the majority, as the lanugage in the opinion shows
that state wrongful death statutes were applied in deference to state policy:
The policy expressed by a State Legislature in enacting a wrongful death
statute is not merely that death shall give rise to a right of recovery, nor
even that tortious conduct resulting in death shall be actionable, but that
damages shall be recoverable when conduct of a particular kind results in
death. It is incumbent upon a court enforcing that policy to enforce it all;
it may not pick or choose.'
The traditional position of the Court in The Tungus was reaffirmed in
Hess v. United States" and a companion case, Goett v. Union Carbide
Corp.," but the further division of the Justices in those cases represented
an enigma which suggested a growing concern for federal policy and the
consequent overruling of The Harrisburg's rationale. In Hess the issue
facing the Court was whether to apply a higher standard of care created
by application of the state's wrongful death statute than would be the
case under the maritime law. Although the majority upheld the constitu-
tionality of the statute, the opinion left open the question whether a state
wrongful death statute "might contain provisions so offensive to tradi-
tional principles of maritime law that the admiralty would decline to en-
force them."" In Goett the Court remanded a wrongful death action to
determine whether the state statute involved employed a maritime or local
concept of negligence. Yet, four of the six Justices who comprised the
majority in Hess joined in the opinion "solely under the compulsion of
the Court's ruling in [The Tungus]" and reserved their positions whether
"I1d. at 589 n.4.
61 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:31-1 (1953).
"a This aspect of the holding is questionable as there was no apparent authority for the circuit
court's finding that the state statute in question allowed unseaworthiness as a basis for recovery.
The Supreme Court affirmed on the basis that such a finding was not "clearly erroneous." 358
U.S. at 594.
6 358 U.S. at 597 (separate opinion).
64 Id.
Id. at 593.
"361 U.S. 314 (1960).07361 U.S. 340 (1960).
6s361 U.S. 314, 320 (1960).
I[Vol. 3 6
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that decision should be overruled.6 ' Mr. Justice Harlan in Hess reaffirmed
the local interest doctrine, but dissented from the majority's conclusion that
the statute was constitutional, reasoning that even hough the maritime
law permited the state to create a right of action, it did not follow that
the maritime law should permit a stricter standard to be applied." Mr.
Justice Harlan's position was unchanged in Goett,"' but the dissenting
opinions in that case demonstrate support of The Tungus to the same
extent that the majority in Hess demonstrated opposition to that case.72
Both opinions took the view that maritime law can be remedially supple-
mented by state wrongful death legislation, but state that the characteristic
features of maritime law define the conditions and scope of the state
remedy.7 This result leads to the conclusion underlying Moragne: if it
is desirable that the duties and liabilities of a shipowner for mere injury
be determined by a uniform federal law, no reason appears why it is not
equally desirable that his liability for death be uniform under federal law.
II. MORAGNE V. STATES MARINE LINES, INc.-THE JUDICIAL SOLUTION
An analysis of Moragne is best accomplished by noting that the peti-
tioner's theory of recovery for death caused by an unseaworthy vessel is
precisely the same as the theory advanced in The Tungus. Assuming that
both petitioners had provable claims, under the doctrine of The Harris-
burg the same breach of the duty to provide a seaworthy ship would have
led to completely opposite results. In The Tungus the petitioner was allow-
ed recovery because it was held that the New Jersey wrongful death statute
encompassed unseaworthiness as a basis of liability. In Moragne, however,
it was determined both by the state court and on appeal that the Florida
wrongful death statute did not encompass such a claim." Thus, applying
the rationale that the maritime law must look to the local wrongful death
remedy, The Tungus petitioner recovered, while the Moragne petitioner
was remediless, even though the same conduct would have produced lia-
bility in both cases ha dthe decedent survived his injuries.
In Moragne, however, the Supreme Court unanimously reversed the
holding by the court of appeals that the petitioner was precluded from
recovery by the operation of Florida law. In an opinion written by Mr.
Justice Harlan the Court stated that such a result "is such an unjustifiable
anomaly in the present maritime law that it should no longer be followed"'
Accordingly, the doctrine of The Harrisburg was overruled. In concluding
that The Harrisburg was neither founded on good reason nor justified by
policy the Court declared that where existing law imposes a primary duty,
violations of which are compensable if they cause injury, nothing in ordi-
"Id. at 321.
7 Id. at 322 (dissenting opinion).
71 361 U.S. 340 at 344 (dissenting opinion).
" For a possible explanation, see Comment, 28 U. CHI. L. REV. 339, 351 (1961).
"aCompare 361 U.S. 340, 347 with 361 U.S. 314, 320. This conclusion is based on the assump-
tion that the majority in Hess would have struck the Oregon statute had the standard been so
strict as to prejudice the maritime law.
74 409 F.2d 32 (1969).
75 Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 378 (1970).
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nary notions of justice suggests that a violation should be nonactionable
simply because it was serious enough to cause death."0 This reasoning, how-
ever, ignores any deference to state interest policy, a consideration that
was championed by Mr. Justice Harlan himself throughout the debates
among the Justices in The Tungus, Hess and Goett." The difficulty for
Mr. Justice Harlan in making the state interest argument in the present
case, however, is that the same argument could be advanced by the states
to extend local law to provide a remedy for personal injuries not resulting
in death in maritime cases, a proposition that even Mr. Justice Harlan has
refused to recognize as tenable.' Furthermore, conceding the interest an-
alysis, the opinion in Moragne clearly shows that the Court now considers
the federal interest of uniformity to far outweigh any justification for
applying state law to provide a remedy in wrongful death cases. Finally,
there is little logic in saying that the state interest is minimal when a
maritime wage-earner is only incapacited by a tortious injury, and maxi-
mal when killed.
The Court's holding that the maritime law provides a remedy for
wrongful death represents a departure from previous views which at-
tempted to circumvent the decision of The Harrisburg. Even the dissenting
Justices in The Tungus did not advocate the overruling of that case,
maintaining that state remedies should be utilized to enforce federal
rights. " Still, it is felt that this approach stemmed from prevailing con-
cepts of judicial propriety over Congress in light of the DOHSA, which
expressly excepted a cause of action for death within state territorial
waters. Both the majority and minority opinions in The Tungus seem to
have regarded that exemption as a pronouncement of legislative policy
which would create an obstacle to the Court's own creation of a right of
action. In answering to this argument Mr. Justice Harlan maintained in
Moragne that the discrepancy by the DOHSA simply could not have been
foreseen by Congress, and, in acting to fill the void created by The Harris-
burg Congress legislated only to the three-mile limit "because that was the
extent of the problem."" So interpreted, "the DOHSA does not by its
own force abrogate available ... nonstatutory federal remedies that might
be found appropriate to effectuate the policies of the general maritime
law." It can be argued, however, that Mr. Justice Harlan merely assumes
the answer in arriving at this result, especially in the light of congressional
inaction in spite of growing maritime theories of recovery. Inherent in
any congressional inaction with regard to state-created remedies is a prob-
lem of federalism which requires an examination of legislative purpose in
making an adjustment of national and local policies. This is not to say that
the Court in Moragne has flown in the face of a congressional determina-
"I1d. at 381.
"See generally, Currie, supra note 58, at 186-207.
78 See, e.g., the dissenting opinion in Hess where Mr. Justice Harlan states that the fact that
the federal maritime law permits the state to create a right of action does not mean that the states
may permit a stricter standard han is allowed under the maritime law. 361 U.S. at 333.
"The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588, 608 (1959) (dissenting opinion).
85Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 398 (1970).
" Id. at 400.
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tion to grant authority to the states to enact wrongful death legislation in
maritime cases. The very ambiguity of the DOHSA leaves ample room for
judicial balancing of interests within the traditional concepts of federalism.
Nevertheless, the Court in Moragne has termed the problem as accommo-
dation of national versus local interests which may require more than
mere inquiry into the questionably ascertainable purpose of the DOHSA.
Even so, the balancing of humanitarian policy against the disuniformity
created by the application of state wrongful death legislation appears to
require the result achieved in the instant case and the resulting application
of federal law.
The final consideration involving the overruling of The Harrisburg
concerns the force of stare decisis, i.e., "the necessity of maintaining public
faith in the judiciary as a source of impersonal and reasoned judgments."'
Using this test, the Court concluded that the mainstay of stare decisis is
"singularly absent in this case."'  This conclusion is unquestionably cor-
rect, as it does not require much reasoning to determine that a shipowner
could hardly be justified in relying on any doctrine of stare decisis that
requires his observance of a duty to provide a seaworthy vessel to prevent
liability to compensate for injury, but not death. Morevore, the mere
force of the decision in The Harrisburg would not compell an opposite
result. The reasoning of that decision "had little justification except in
primitive English history-a history far removed from the American law
of remedies for maritime deaths."
4
III. MORAGNE-ITS MEANING AND EFFECT
Although Moragne potentially applies to an number of established doc-
trines in admiralty, from the practical viewpoint of claimants, the sig-
nificance of the decision is its bearing upon whether maritime law will be
applied so as to make the decedent's contributory negligence mitigate re-
covery, in contrast to the common law rule of a complete bar to recovery;
and whether the maritime concept of unseaworthiness will be available
along with other maritime doctrines of recovery for wrongful death. In
Moragne these questions were not directly in issue, the case being remanded
in order to make the necessary factual determinations, and the Court left
the questions open for future litigation.' The decision points out, however,
that a determination of these issues "does not require the fashioning of a
whole body of federal law . . . ." and the opinion further indicates that
the courts may look for guidance in the DOHSA."
The question of the amount of recovery should present no particular
difficulty. Under the maritime law, the negligence of a claim does not bar





8""The only one of these statutes that applies not just to a class of workers but to any 'person,'
and that bases liability on conduct violative of general maritime law, is the Death on the High
Seas Act." Id. at 407-8.
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recovery for personal injuries but only mitigates the damages in propor-
tion to which his negligence contribution to the injury." There appears to
be no reason why the mere fact of death should alter the result in this
respect.
The scope of the remedy for unseaworthiness presents more dificulty.
By virtue of Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki,s° the concept of unseaworthi-
ness has evolved into a "species of liability without fault . . . neither
limited by conceptions of negligence nor contractual in nature. ' * More-
over, the remedy has been exteneded beyond those injured aboard ship to
those workers injured on the peir who are considered seamen prohaec vice."
Despite the expansion of the remedy, by the application of The Harrisburg
even a member of a ship's crew who sustained fatal injuries within the
territorial waters of a state left his survivors limited to a statutory remedy
under the Jones Act, which, by its very terms, excludes unseaworthiness.
This proposition was affirmed in Lindgren v. United States"2 where the
Court held the Jones Act to be the exclusive remedy for the wrongful
death of a seaman, thereby precluding recovery under a state death statute.
Lindgren was affirmed in Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp.3 The
Court in that case reasoned that the absence of the phrase "at his election"
from the Jones Act was an expression of legislative intent to exclude state
death remedies for unseaworthiness. Several arguments can be advanced,
however, in an attempt to make Lindgren and Gillespie consistent with
Moragne. In the first place, unseaworthiness and negligence are not "in-
consistent" theories and as such would not be disruptive of the exclusive
nature of the Jones Act. Regardless of the standard of care applicable, un-
seaworthiness still requires a defect that caused the injury or death. More-
over, the "exclusiveness" of the remedy referred to in Lindgren was in-
tended only to distinguish the possible conflict between federal and state
remedies, and not to the various federal remedies, either statutory or under
the maritime law. It can be further argued that since state statutes were
the only remedy available when death occurred from a maritime tort in
state territorial waters at the time of the passage of the Jones Act, Con-
gress could not have intended that Act to be the only remedy ever to exist
for wrongful death."4
In Moragne the Court in a footnote applied this proposition in holding
that Gillespie "does not disturb the seaman's rights under the general mari-
time law, existing alongside his Jones Act claim."' The detrminative con-
88See, e.g., Ahlgren v. Red Star Towing Co., 214 F.2d 618 (2d Cir. 1954).
'9328 U.S. 85 (1946).
10Id. at 90.
" See International Stevedoring Co. v. Haverty, 272 U.S. 50 (1926); Jamison v. Encarnacion,
281 U.S. 635 (1930).
12281 U.S. 38 (1930).
03379 U.S. 148 (1964).
" This conclusion may, of course, beg the essential question. Nevertheless, by the express terms
of the statute, the states are not precluded from acting when on-shore death occurs by wrongful
act. Furthermore, there is authority for the proposition that the Jones Act is not exclusive vis a
vis the Death on the High Seas Act. The analogy has consistently been attributed to congressional
intent. See GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 37, at 304; S. REP. No. 216, 66th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1920).
" Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 396 n.12 (1970).
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sideration, according to Mr. Justice Harlan, is that the maritime action
for wrongful death is beyond the preclusive effect of the Jones Act as
interpreted in Gillespie. Additionally, the Court declared that the existance
of such a remedy is desirable because it "will further, rather than hinder,
uniformity in the exercise of admiralty jurisdiction . . . ."' From this it
follows that the Court was more predisposed to limit Gillespie and Lind-
gren rather than reversing the holdings. Nevertheless, the effect of
Moragne is to overrule those cases sub silentio and make the Jones Act an
operational nullity. Since the obligation of a shipower to his crew to pro-
vide a seaworthy vessel has been held to be substantially greater than the
duty imposed by an ordinary negligence action, it naturally follows that
claimants will choose the easiest road to recovery. Regardless of that effect,
the result of Moragne at least eliminates the anomalous situation with
which the survivors of seamen were confronted under The Harrisburg,
and confines Lindgren and Gillespie to the area which they properly oc-
cupy, i.e., state legislation dealing with wrongful death is superseded with
regard to seamen.
IV. CONCLUSION
Analysis of the cases in which state statutes have been applied to mari-
time death has indicated that when applied, state law is in derogation of
the maritime law, and the result is not justified by an assertion of state
interest. Therefore, the competing interests which finally overruled the
decisions of The Harrisburg and The Tungus are felt to be justified in the
interest of national policy as well as by precedent. The question of the
interrelationship of federal and state law was resolved in Moragne by re-
sorting to principles of maritime law which were created because of the
special nature of the maritime risk that demands uniformity of application,
a result that seems both equitable and workable. Nor will there be a differ-
ence in resulting if the states are forced to recognize this obligation of the
federal law to determine all substantive rights of parties according to uni-
form principles. However, this result seems unlikely. Some elements of
state wrongful death law seems most certain to remain, and the Court's
assumption in Moragne that "the difficulties should be slight ....
seems somewhat problematical in this regard. Periods of limitation and,
perhaps, liability limitations are examples of a host of problems which
have been held to traditionally fall within the sphere of state adjustment.
Furthermore, since the state courts are given concurrent in personam juris-
diction in maritime claims," those courts may decline to entertain a con-
sideration of uniformity of the federal law other than as the state court
finds it when considering local limitations on liability. An examination of
the judicial process casts doubt on whether resolution will ever be forth-
9i d.
97 Id. at 406.
9"1 Stat. 77 (1789). The Judiciary Act was amended in 1948 to read: "Any civil case of ad-
miralty or maritime jurisdiction, savings to suitors in all cases all other remedies to which they
are otherwise entitled." 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1948). For a critical discussion, see Black, supra note 9.
1970]
758 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [Vol. 36
coming without further Supreme Court or congressional action. In view of
previous congressional inaction and its hesitation to act within the state's
territorial waters, an ardous road of litigation appears to be ahead The
courts have often had difficulty discriminating between cases which suggest
a need for the federal interest and cases embodying strong state policies
with which federal courts should not interfere. These appear to be minor
problems, however, in light of the overruling of a condition of law, the
primary consequences of which attached responsibility solely upon the
fortuity of death. Under such a system, the state creation of remedies cre-
ated only confusion, the very presence of which negated the justification
that state law should apply.
Larry Gene Alexander
